Funding of elections after electoral bonds: what transparent model should India adopt?

On 15 February 2024, a five-judge bench of the Supreme Court struck down the Electoral Bond Scheme. It held that anonymous political donations violate voters' right to information under Article 19(1)(a). The question of how parties and elections should be funded remains open.

Options people propose

• Full public disclosure of every donation above a small threshold, published quickly.
• Partial state funding of elections. The Indrajit Gupta Committee (1998) recommended limited state funding in kind.
• A national election fund that pools donations and distributes them by a formula.
• Strict spending caps on parties, not just candidates, with real audits.

Points of disagreement

• Disclosure protects voters, but donors fear retaliation from those in power.
• State funding reduces dependence on big donors, but costs taxpayers and could favour existing parties.
• Spending caps are hard to enforce when cash is used.

Questions to discuss

• Which model would you support, and why?
• How should enforcement work?

Sources:

• Supreme Court judgment summary (LiveLaw): livelaw.in/amp/top-stories/supreme-court…
• Association for Democratic Reforms v. Union of India: en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Association_for_Democrat…